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概要
　アフガニスタンの平和構築プロセスは、‘light-footprint approach’（小さな足跡）という
政策に基づいている。アフガニスタンの治安状況は、反政府グループ、麻薬密輸貿易、国
内民兵、テロリストグループにより複雑化されている。麻薬対策、武装解除、軍隊の再統
合、国際治安支援部隊、アメリカ主導の多国籍軍等のアフガニスタンの平和構築における
様々な安全保障の問題は、迅速性や効率性の欠如にあり、その原因の一つは ‘light-foot-
print approach’ にあると考えられる。このような政策は、国際社会によるアフガニスタ
ンの治安状況に対しての過小評価とそれによるコミットメント不足によるところが多い。
アフガニスタンは ‘light-footprint approach’ を採るには未成熟な国家であると考えるべき
であろう。
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Abstracts
　　The entire process of peace-building in Afghanistan has been based on one operating 
principle, namely, a ‘light-footprint’ approach. Security in Afghanistan is extremely 
complicated, due to anti-Government spoiler groups, the narcotics trade, and regional 
warlords, in addition to the terrorist groups. This paper points out that several key security-
related sectors in Afghan peace-building, including counter-narcotics measures, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), and the US-led Coalition force, have been so slow and 
ineffective, mainly because of the adoption of a light-footprint approach. Such a strategy 
is due to underestimating the security situation in Afghanistan and a lack of commitment 
to the entire peace-building process by the international community. Overall, Afghanistan 
is still too immature a state for a light-footprint approach to be adopted especially in the 
security sector.
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1. Introduction
　　Post-conflict peace-building has established fame and popularity. The demand for 
peace-building missions has increased in the post-Cold War period since a number of 
internal conflicts in Asia and Africa necessitated the building of newly-democratised states 
within their own territories. During this period, peace-building missions have been 
dispatched to Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. Afghanistan is not exceptional. 
　　Meanwhile, researching for peace-building in Afghanistan as a case study is 
considered to be particularly significant. This is because peace-building in Afghanistan is 
unique compared to other peace-building missions for the following four aspects.
　　First, most “post-conflict” peace-building missions are established after the internal 
conflicts are finished and the ceasefires are reached. However, in Afghanistan’s case, no 
ceasefire was reached between the military factions. For example, in Cambodia’s case, all 
political factions signed the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, including the Khmer Rouge, which 
were then followed by the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992. In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban was not 
invited to the Bonn Agreement held in November and December 2002. Furthermore, the 
four factions, including the Northern Alliance, which were invited and signed the 
Agreement, did not represent the majority of Afghan citizens.1
　　Second, peace-building has normally been conducted as a single and individual 
mission. Occasionally, plural missions are involved in one state-building process, for 
example, in Haiti, Somalia and East Timor. In those states, a peace-enforcement mission 
was initially established in order to create peace, followed by peacekeeping or peace-
building as a neutral actor. However, the situation in Afghanistan is totally different, where 
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the coalition forces are currently conducting ‘wars on terrors’ against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda, in the so-called ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’ On the same soil, the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been playing a supportive role as a peacekeeper to 
enhance security and help Afghan authorities retain ownership of the peace process.2 
Furthermore, peace-building in Afghanistan has been positively introduced by a new type 
of security-building measure: the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The SSR process in 
Afghanistan consists of five pillars: creating the Afghan National Army led by the US; 
creating the Afghan National Police led by Germany; establishing the judicial sector led 
by Italy; counter-narcotics measures led by the UK; and enhancing the process of 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) led by Japan.   
　　Third, most peace-building missions help build new states which collapse due to 
internal conflicts among different religious or ethnic factions resulting in anarchy or near 
anarchy. However, in Afghanistan, the international actors, especially the US-led coalition 
eliminated the existing Taliban regime by force, and then tried to create their favoured 
regime and state. In other words, whether it is legitimate or not from the viewpoint of 
international convention or ethics, peace-building in Afghanistan, similar to the case of 
Iraq, has played a role in replacing an existing sovereign state with a totally different one.
　　Fourth, compared to many other cases, peace-building in Afghanistan has had to be 
conducted in a highly corrupt society and economy. On the one hand, Afghanistan is one 
of the poorest states as measured by UN economic standards. On the other hand, 
Afghanistan is infamous for having an economy that is virtually sustained by illegal 
industries such as opium production and smuggling. Therefore, the counter-narcotics 
measures should be a key issue for the peace-building process in Afghanistan. Combined 
with such an illegal economy, politics in Afghanistan have been contaminated by bribery 
and other corruption. Therefore, state-building in Afghanistan must necessarily be more 
complicated and difficult than, say, in East Timor which is simply an economically poor 
state.
　　The focus on peace-building in Afghanistan is also significant because its successful 
implementation holds particular importance for international politics. Afghanistan is 
located in the middle of two highly tense areas, namely the Middle East, and India-
Pakistan. Therefore, if internal conflicts resume in this state, the domino effect could 
negatively influence its neighbouring states which could bring serious problems for 
international security. In other words, the stability of the state of Afghanistan will 
contribute to preventing a chain of conflict in Central Asia. 
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　　It is possible that peace-building in Afghanistan is one of the conditions for the 
eradication of terrorist networks in Asia. In fact, when the war in Iraq occurred in 2003, 
the remnants of the Taliban and other terrorist groups became active in Afghanistan.
　　Furthermore, peace-building in Afghanistan can be seen as a touchstone for several 
new approaches to peace operations advocated by the international society. For example, 
the UN has issued several official documents and policies regarding peace-building, post-
conflict development and aid, such as An Agenda for Peace in 1992, the Brahimi Report in 
2000, the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and Report of the Secretary-General’s High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004. Therefore, peace-building in 
Afghanistan as well as in East Timor and Kosovo should be given attention as possible 
models to meet the demand for a new type of state-building standard.
　　It is to be noted that the entire process of peace-building in Afghanistan has been 
based on one operating principle, that is a “light footprint” approach. The light footprint 
strategy was in fact officially encouraged by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan3 and 
his Special Representative in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), Lakhdar Brahimi.4 This approach has been applied in the case of Afghanistan 
in particular due to the following three factors: a negative image among the Afghan people 
of a foreign presence because of British and Soviet incursions; lessons learned from 
heavily-involved peace-building in Kosovo and East Timor; and the ongoing US war 
against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and a reluctance of foreign troops to be deployed in 
Afghanistan.  
　　However, the continued volatile security situation in Afghanistan despite several years 
of international intervention encourages one to reconsider the legitimacy of the light-
footprint approach to the security sphere. This paper will focus on the current key sectors 
directly affecting security in Afghanistan, that is, counter-narcotics measures, DDR, ISAF 
and the US-led coalition force. It will discuss why the above sectors, which are all 
important for the successful implementation of the entire peace-building process, have 
been quite slow and ineffective in developing their functions. This paper will also suggest 
that the four sectors are related to each other in enhancing the entire security of 
Afghanistan, and finally will give several recommendations on this issue.
2. Counter-narcotics Measure in Afghanistan
　　The opium industry has had a huge impact on the Afghan economy and society as 
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well as on the peace-building process. Afghanistan produces 87 percent of the world’s 
opium, and the income from its production and trafficking in 2005 was estimated at $2.7 
billion, which is equivalent to 52 percent of Afghanistan’s legal gross domestic product.5 
Since 2001 opium production has increased exponentially, and in 2004 poppy cultivation 
was present in 28 out of the 32 provinces in Afghanistan, and opium poppy cultivation 
increased 64 percent from 2003.6 This means that, unlike other opium-producing countries, 
opium production in Afghanistan is not limited to remote areas inaccessible to the 
government but to almost all areas in Afghanistan.
　　In fact, the poppy industry is very attractive to Afghan farmers. Afghan poppy farmers 
are expected to earn $2,520 per year, compared with $670 for other farmers.7 The poppy 
crop is relatively weather resistant, and is easy to store, transport and sell. Unlike legal 
crops, opium does not require fertilizers and irrigation.
　　However, opium poppy cultivation has had negative consequences for Afghan 
security, politics and the economy. According to Felbab-Brown, with profits in the tens of 
millions of dollars, local warlords can easily finance their militias and maintain their 
popularity by sponsoring local development projects such as schools, sewage and 
irrigation systems, and clinics. Even after the implementation of the demobilization 
process, some of the leading warlords’ militias accumulated profits from opium, making it 
easy for many warlords to reconstitute themselves.8
　　The opium industry has also brought about several serious conflicts between 
international actors and Afghan militias that are drug traffickers. In fact, the battle between 
insurgent groups and the US-led coalition force in Sangin District of Helmand Province on 
29 March 2006 wounded three Canadians and one American soldier. Helmand is the main 
opium poppy growing district in Afghanistan, and therefore there has been widespread 
violence since an aggressive counter-narcotics campaign started.9 In Helmand, the Taliban 
has forged an alliance with drug smugglers, provides protection for drug convoys, and 
carries out attacks to keep the government away and the poppy flourishing.10 As a result, 
legitimate commerce has also been negatively influenced since the opium trade 
undermines the authority of government and social institutions. Legitimate merchants in 
Pakistan in particular have suffered from the smuggling of opium and other products from 
Afghanistan.11
　　Encouraging opium production also threatens the Afghan peace process politically by 
providing an opportunity for criminal organizations and corrupt politicians to enter the 
political space, undermining the democratic process. According to the International 
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Herald Tribune, up to 25 percent of the newly-elected Parliament was involved in the 
drugs.12
　　Opium production has had a negative influence on the Afghan economy as well. 
Essentially, most of the profit from opium goes to a very few traffickers, warlords and 
militia leaders, rather than to the impoverished farmers. Opium production has also 
contributed to inflation, a rapid rise in real estate prices and is undermining currency 
stability. It is suspected that Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been involved in the 
laundering of money estimated to be $400,000, which has been made from drug-related 
activities. Estimating that the September 11 attacks cost $300,000-500,000. These 
terrorist attacks in the US would not have been possible without drug-related money 
laundering in Afghanistan.13
　　Thus, counter-narcotics is one of the most important measures in promoting peace-
building in Afghanistan. It can be said that in the long term the major threat to stability in 
Afghanistan is unlikely to be terrorism or warlords but failure to eliminate organised crime 
and narcotics trafficking.14 Britain has been in charge of counter-narcotics measures in the 
Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan. The first programme to deal with the drugs issue 
was a British-sponsored poppy eradication programme, the so-called “buy-back 
programme”, which provided monetary incentives for cooperation. However, the 
eradication programme presented a great security dilemma. Eradicating the poppy industry 
would help diminish the influence of factional warlords and the Taliban, and enhance the 
authority of the Afghan Government. However, an increasing proportion of the Afghan 
population earns their livelihood from the drug trade, and most of them have no equivalent 
alternatives. As a result, eradicating the poppy industry could impoverish these people. 
Thus, such an incoherent counter-narcotics strategy may further worsen the current 
security situation.15 In fact, the British-led $34 million “buy-back” was forced to be swiftly 
discontinued, and poppy cultivation actually increased in the targeted areas. Much of the 
money spent by the British eradication scheme in 2002 and 2003 ended up in the hands of 
regional warlords, and many Afghan growers agreeing to eradicate their crops never got 
any money.16
　　Planting alternative crops has also been encouraged by the British Government. 
However, the value of the opium crop at “farm-gate” prices was $600 million in 2004, 
while the amount of money earmarked for alternative crops in 2005 was just $380 million. 
The alternative livelihood scheme has been so slow that it has not reached the stage to 
create a sustainable agricultural infrastructure.17
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　　Furthermore, disagreement between Britain and the US on how best to advance the 
counter-narcotics measures has fragmented donor support. The US State Department has 
sponsored the formation of a Ministry of Interior Organized Central Eradication Force. In 
contrast, the British continues to support an Afghan Narcotics Force supported by its own 
special forces. The competing strategies have impeded progress.18
　　On the whole, British counter-narcotics measures have been far from effective and 
successful. Presumably, the international community underestimated the difficulty and 
intractability of the influence of the opium trade over Afghan society. The counter-
narcotics strategy should be considered more comprehensively and conducted in a larger 
framework instead of depending on one contributing state to solve it.   
3. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan
　　In general, the successful DDR of ex-combatants is crucial to achieving peace-
building. Hikmet Cetin, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, stated that, 
due to the fragmentation and polarization of the country, a direct outcome of the long 
years of occupation and civil war, securing success in the DDR project has an importance 
second-to-none in the immediate term in Afghanistan. He also said that it is only once the 
process is fully completed that establishing physical security and stability as well as 
securing the reach of the central government in the provinces will be possible.19 
　　On 22 February 2003, the Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was 
established to conduct the DDR programme by the Afghan Government with Japan as a 
lead nation supported by UNAMA and UNDP. In early 2003, ANBP established a goal of 
100,000 militiamen to be integrated through DDR. Implementation of the programme 
began in October 2003, following an initial reform of the Ministry of Defence. The DDR 
programme was first piloted during the run-up to the parliamentary and provincial council 
elections in 2003 as a means of implementing the electoral criteria that prevented 
individuals having links to illegal armed groups from standing as candidates. As a result, 
34 candidates were disqualified from participating in the elections and 4,857 weapons 
were handed over by 124 candidates.20 About 16 months later, on 7 July 2005, the 
disarmament and demobilization portion of the programme ended, with more than 63,380 
Afghan Military Forces troops disarmed, with up to about 53,000 having been assisted 
with reintegration.21
　　However, it is generally agreed that the DDR process in Afghanistan was slow and 
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delayed by a lot of factors. The first factor which delayed the DDR was the historical and 
socio-cultural norms. Due to twenty years of civil wars in Afghanistan, the Pakistan border 
areas have been flooded with weapons. Pakistan became a major supplier of arms to the 
Afghan mujahedin. A lucrative illegal arms trade developed in the region. In particular, it 
flooded the North-West Frontier Province with automatic arms. A ‘Kalashnikov culture’ 
has prevailed, bringing about the proliferation of arms and common resort to violence in 
the Pashtun-populated border area. Because of the cultural affinity with weapons and a 
warrior culture, militias resisted surrendering their arms. Under these circumstances, the 
overall impact of the DDR programme in Afghanistan was limited.22
　　The second factor of the ineffectiveness of the DDR process was the lack of support 
from the Ministry of Defence in the Afghan Government. Afghanistan presents an 
exceptional case on DDR implementation, in which the local Ministry of Defence has 
maintained a hostile position towards the process. While the Ministry of Defence has 
publicly endorsed the ANBP, it has taken a number of covert steps to prevent it. For 
example, in early 2004, the Ministry of Defence instructed local militia commanders in a 
number of districts to recruit new forces. This is a clear violation of its agreement with 
ANBP in the DDR process.23
　　The lack of impartiality is also reflected in the slow process of the DDR in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there are informal militias, including various factional 
commanders’ private militias. They operate independently but are, in practice, not 
categorized as militias to be processed through the DDR programme.24 There is also a 
growing concern about the fact that several specific warlords are open to the reintegration 
of their militia into the Afghan National Army (ANA). This is a concern because the ANA 
should ideally consist of impartial army personnel who have not experienced the civil 
wars in Afghanistan. Although the success of DDR requires a consistent and universal 
implementation of the programme, this condition has not been applied in Afghanistan. 
Currently, the private militias who used to be controlled by the former Minister of Defence 
Muhammad Fahim have been favourably employed as new members of ANA. Thus, the 
DDR in Afghanistan, which should essentially expect confidence-building, has given rise 
to a distrust among the Afghan people.25 The quality of the entire DDR process received 
some criticism:
　　The militia forces processed through DDR were those considered as the most 
expendable by the warlords. Commanders also retain large numbers of civilian followers, 
who may be mobilized as and when necessary. It has been suggested that many of these 
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men, equipped with obsolete arms, have been put into the DDR process, while the full-time 
fighters and their more sophisticated weaponry have been held back.26
　　It is to be noted that external factors have also negatively influenced the DDR process 
in Afghanistan. Astri Suhrke pointed out that many developing countries have become the 
grounds for “surplus weapons”, which has made the disarming of ex-combatants and 
factions difficult. There has been a growth of international arms dealers smuggling the 
huge surplus of weapons from the former Warsaw Pact countries. Such illegal trade, 
violating principles of international law, have not been tackled effectively. Furthermore, 
even some Western governments have covertly supplied the Afghan insurgent forces with 
sophisticated weapons.27
　　Thus, a lack of promptness and accuracy in the DDR operation in Afghanistan has 
affected security in Afghanistan. The concept of a light footprint is difficult to apply 
regarding DDR in Afghanistan where both the Afghan Government and the big powers are 
not willing to cooperate.
4. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) 
　　ISAF was established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 
December 2001 and was to be deployed in Kabul and its surrounding areas with a mandate 
of providing security for the Afghan Government and citizens, and UN agencies. In 
October 2003, UN Security Council 1510 paved the way for ISAF to expand its mission 
beyond Kabul. In carrying out this mission, ISAF currently conducts patrols throughout 
the 16 different police districts in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a third of these 
patrols are carried out jointly with the Kabul City Police. ISAF has been financed by 
common funding from the troop-contributing states.
　　Initially, ISAF was commanded by the British, and then in turn for six-month periods 
by the Turks, Germans and Dutch. In August 2003, ISAF came under NATO command. 
ISAF was the NATO’s first distant expeditionary operation, which was legitimized in the 
first NATO invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks.28 In short, 
ISAF was Alliance’s first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.
　　ISAF has been mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and therefore can be 
categorised as peace-enforcement. However, its mandate is different from those of the 
previous NATO-led missions such as SFOR and IFOR, which were primary security 
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provider. ISAF has played, rather, a supporting role to enhance security and help Afghan 
authorities retain ownership.29 It is also to be noted that the number of ISAF personnel in 
Afghanistan has been relatively small compared to other like-minded peace-building or 
peacekeeping missions. For example, UNTAC in Cambodia had 16,000 soldiers and 3,500 
civilian police officers: IFOR in Bosnia had 60,000 soldiers; and UNTAET in East Timor 
had 7,000 soldiers. The number in ISAF was initially 4,500, and then increased to 9,000 
troops from 35 NATO and non-NATO troop-contributing countries.30 However, 
Afghanistan is much larger than East Timor in geographic size, and is, in fact, slightly 
larger than France.31 In reality, NATO has struggled to find troops to meet the demand for 
an adequate level of peace-building, and consequently, international troops in Afghanistan 
have had the lowest ratio to population and to the area of territory compared to other post-
conflict operations.
　　Meanwhile, the security situation in Afghanistan should not be viewed optimistically 
and is rather worse than the other cases mentioned above. Afghanistan’s security crisis has 
been complicated, including the resurgence of anti-government spoiler groups, the 
burgeoning narcotics trade, the entrenchment of regional power brokers or warlords, and 
the rising incidence of banditry and general criminality.32 In fact, since Spring 2003 the 
security situation in especially the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan has 
deteriorated considerably. In the interim report of the UN Secretary-General on the 
situation in Afghanistan published in March 2006, Kofi Annan indicated particular concern 
about suicide bombings and anti-Government element-related incidents. According to the 
official report, prior to 2005, there had been only five cases of suicide bombing in the 
preceding three years. In 2005, there were 17. By 23 February 2006, the annual total for 
2006 already stood at 11. The number of anti-Government element-related incidents has 
also grown unabated since 2003. In fact, the frequency of such attacks during the latter 
half of 2005 and the start of 2006 (200 per month) was higher than during any of the 
previous reporting periods. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Taliban and other 
insurgent forces have shifted their strategy from targeting coalition forces, in 2002 and 
2003, to attacking Afghan civilians and personnel from NGOs.33 This demonstrates the 
deterioration of the security environment in Afghanistan. Kofi Annan concluded in the 
report that the democratization and state-building achievements of the past four years 
remain fragile.34 In 2004, 47 percent of Afghanistan’s administrative districts (169 of 361) 
were considered by the UN to be medium or high-risk areas.35
　　Therefore, ISAF’s modest mandate and size has reflected volatile security in 
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Afghanistan. As the paper by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit put it:   
　　... the international community and even the international military forces appear 
plagued by timidity [in Afghanistan]. ... International military commanders assert they can 
only stay in Afghanistan with the consent of the factional commanders, and they cannot 
afford to be confrontational or assertive in their dealing with them. This attitude sells 
short of the moral authority of ... the military power of the Coalition and ISAF, and it sells 
out the people of Afghanistan for whom this may be the most pressing of all security 
issues.36
　　ISAF soldiers have been the target of assaults from the Afghan militias. For example, 
in November 2005, four occupants of an ISAF vehicle were caught in an explosion in the 
northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, and one Swedish soldier died from his injuries 
after being evacuated from the incident.37 In May 2006, a light armoured vehicle was 
similarly struck by a roadside bomb, killing two Italian soldiers and injuring four, in the 
south of Kabul.38
　　The unwillingness of the US to co-operate with ISAF has also been a serious factor of 
the slow process of its mission. In fact, the US refused to provide airlift, intelligence, and 
extraction support for ISAF when there was discussion of expanding ISAF to five cities 
outside of Kabul in winter 2002.39 US peacekeeping policy has been reviewed since the 
attacks of 11 September, which led to a much more hawkish policy marginalising 
peacekeeping. In 2002, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld commented on the ISAF, 
“We are already taking part in the peacekeeping force by providing logistics, intelligence, 
quick-reaction force support. I mean, that is big.” President Bush’s then-national security 
adviser, Condoleezza Rice, also said in an interview with the New York Times, “The US is 
the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is 
necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And extended 
peacekeeping detracts from our readiness for these kinds of global missions.”40
　　Clearly, the limited scale of ISAF remains insufficient to bring stability to the entire 
Afghan state.  A larger and more robust ISAF presence would arguably prevent Afghan 
warlords from resorting to force and would lead them to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, 
there has been a strong sense that without an expanded role for ISAF, the political process, 
disarmament and creation of a multi-ethnic national army have poor prospects. Given this, 
the International Crisis Group strongly recommended the expansion of ISAF forces to 
25,000-30,000 troops.41 It can be said that ISAF has also inevitably adopted a light-
footprint approach. However, the current fragile situation in Afghanistan requires harder 
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security measures conducted by ISAF.  
　　It is also recommended that peace-building and security-building in Afghanistan 
should require more regional participation in expanding ISAF. ISAF and presumably the 
US could learn from Australia’s role in the INTERFET peacekeeping mission in East 
Timor in 1999, when Australia acted as the lead state in the UN-authorized operation and 
requested many neighbouring states to contribute to INTERFET. This was one of the 
major reasons why peacekeeping in East Timor had a good beginning.42 Therefore, 
although retaining guidance from NATO members, ISAF could win more respect from the 
Afghan public and the international community by having more regional contributors from 
Asia. Likewise, if there were more Islamic states involved in peacekeeping missions, then 
the Afghanistan mission, for example, would be more effective. Such Islamic states would 
be willing to get into Afghan communities, and be able to do more extensive and effective 
liaison work with local actors and officials.      
　　Meanwhile, ISAF and other contributing states began a new type of civil-military 
programme commanded by military elements, the so-called ‘Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs).’ The PRTs have maintained a strong focus on “heart and mind” activities, 
including the building of schools and clinics. Another objective of PRTs is, by conducting 
joint efforts with the Afghan Government, to bolster the legitimacy of the Government in 
the regions through improved security, and the facilitation of reconstruction and 
development efforts. Hiknet Cetin stated that this is especially important given that Taliban 
insurgents, warlords, drug traffickers, corruption and lawlessness still threaten investment 
and reconstruction efforts, and that instability poses the biggest obstacle to development in 
Afghanistan.43 As of August 2005, ISAF commanded nine PRTs and the U.S.-led 
Coalition, thirteen. The mission of PRTs was to deploy small groups of coalition soldiers, 
between 70-100 soldiers, in the major provincial cities to assist with security stabilization 
and provide reconstruction assistance. The focus of each PRT is unique. For example, the 
British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif have focused on security, with patrols and even small 
outposts in an area of considerable factional animosity, while in Heart, the Italian PRT has 
emphasised reconstruction and cultural interaction.44
　　However, PRTs have not won full support from the international society. The concept 
of PRTs has been criticized for blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actors 
and for duplicating the efforts of civilian organizations already providing schools, health 
clinics and water supplies. The criticism, especially by NGOs, are taken seriously. Most 
humanitarian actors claim that the construction of schools and clinics by the PRTs, their 
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use of white cars and civilian clothes etc. threaten the humanitarian space and risk 
endangering the lives of aid workers. Some NGOs working in Afghanistan have refused 
even to engage in a dialogue on the PRT issue.45
　　Peter Viggo Jakobsen gave more balanced comments on the PRTs. On the one hand, 
he concluded that the PRTs have been successful because they have helped to extend the 
authority of the Afghan Government beyond Kabul, facilitated reconstruction and 
dampened violence. On the other hand, he also accepted that the PRTs only make sense as 
part of an overall strategy in which they serve to buy time while other instruments are 
employed to tackle the military threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaida; infighting 
between the warlords; the increase in lawlessness and banditry; a booming opium poppy 
cultivation and the drug trade.46 Jakobsen’s comments should be paid significant attention 
for the following two reasons. First, the PRTs are not capable of addressing the security 
issue directly but can only contribute to the defusion of local animosity. In other words, 
the PRTs are a sort of secondary activity. This operation has a similarity with a more 
traditional type of peacekeeping operation which valued the principles of local consent 
and impartiality. Second, successful PRTs are related to the successful implementation of 
other security sectors such as counter-insurgency, DDR and  counter-narcotics operations. 
In short, the PRTs can play a positive role within the rigid framework of security-building 
in Afghanistan. 　    
5. The US-led Coalition Force (Operation Enduring Freedom)
　　Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the official code name used by the US 
Government for its military response to the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 
2001. Especially, the term “OEF” refers to the war in Afghanistan. The force has consisted 
of troops from the US, Canada and the UK. The initial military objectives of OEF included 
the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the 
capture of Al Qaeda leaders, and cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. On 2 May 
2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the end of OEF in Afghanistan. 
However, on 9 December 2003, the US military announced that it had resumed a major 
ground operation in Afghanistan in order to eliminate the remnants of Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban regime.47
　　However, the Coalition force has been in a vulnerable position in Afghanistan. The 
remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces are employing guerilla tactics, drawing on local 
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support, and operating in familiar physical terrain, where they have long years of battle 
experience under similar conditions. Retaliatory allied operations by heavy concentrations 
of troops will likely bring more losses to coalition forces. Losses of civilian life and 
property will result in adverse publicity from human rights organizations and the Muslim 
population around the world.48 Unnecessary loss of human life resulting from large-scale 
military strikes encourages terrorists’ propaganda, which could facilitate recruitment of 
more Jihadis around the world. In reality, skepticism and distrust among Muslims across 
the world about US counterterrorist efforts have impeded international cooperation and 
may become an even bigger problem in the post-Al Qaeda era.49
　　The initial approach to security in OEF was designed to limit the US presence on the 
ground in Afghanistan. Initially, a US force of less than 10,000 was deployed on the 
ground. This policy was based on an American “light-footprint” strategy. It has been said 
that from the outset the US deployed a minimum number of troops to Afghanistan in order 
to preserve troops for the war against Iraq. In 2004, the number of US troops in 
Afghanistan were doubled to 20,000 in order to offset the decreases in security that 
occurred in 2003 and 2004. However, security continued to deteriorate despite this 
counter-insurgency effort.50 Then, the US-led Coalition began to draw down its forces. In 
December 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that the size of the 
US force in Afghanistan would shrink from about 19,000 now to about 16,000 by summer 
in 2006, when the US will hand control of the southern provinces to ISAF. He said that a 
drawdown of US forces would not undermine joint efforts to improve security, and that the 
remaining US troops would continue to help train and equip the Afghan security forces on 
a variety of security projects.51 However, Afghan leaders have been concerned about the 
decrease in US forces, which would be a signal of a declining commitment of the US to 
Afghanistan. They have also expressed concern that ISAF lacks the capabilities to fight a 
counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban.52
　　According to Mark Sedra, the US military in Afghnaistan has been forced to ally itself 
with several regional powerbrokers, providing them with money in return for the use of 
their militias in anti-Taliban operations. In these operations, individual commanders 
receive up to $10,000 per month in cash grants from the US. The relatively small number 
of US troops deployed in Afghanistan has prompted the Pentagon to rely heavily on local 
forces.53
　　However, this situation has seriously affected Security Sector Reform, such as 
counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan. The local warlords are unwilling to provide 
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local human intelligence to those who are destroying their opium business. US troops, 
which received assistance from them for counter-terrorist operations, are also a reluctant 
participant in counter-narcotics operations. This was one reason why these operations have 
not been successful.54 Milton Bearden, who was the CIA’s main liaison to the mujahideen 
during the 1980s, expected a more pessimistic scenario. He claimed that much of the 
intelligence that the warlords have supplied to Washington has proved faulty. Furthermore, 
he warned that warlords would not be willing to co-operate with the US for much longer, 
since they would soon have enough resources to strike out on their own. He explained, 
“With $2.6 billion plus in poppies and another couple of billion that come through in the 
regular smuggling, at what point do the warlords not need us anymore?”55
　　The US continues to finance Afghan warlords in order to hunt Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban. Afghan officials complain that US military operations have been conducted 
without any coordination with the Government. Furthermore, better pay in the US-funded 
militia units have reduced prospects for demobilising the militias for the DDR process. 
Many Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan expressed suspicion regarding US support for 
local warlords.56 Consequently, warlords have not been disarmed, forcing President Karzai 
to make room for them in the cabinet or to accept them as provincial governors. If this 
situation continues, peace-building will never be successful.57
　　Therefore, it can be concluded that the problems of the US-led Coalition force are not 
only the number of troops, but also the underestimating of the potential of Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban and a lack of commitment to the entire peace-building process. If the US had 
assessed its own capability of implementing its counterterrorism strategy more adequately 
and therefore had deployed a larger number of troops in Afghanistan with stronger 
commitment, it would not have needed to depend on local warlords to capture the 
remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the entire security sector in Afghanistan would 
have been more successful. The American light-footprint approach has undermined the 
whole security framework in Afghanistan.     
6. Conclusion
　　This paper dealt with several key sectors relating to the security issues facing peace-
building in Afghanistan, and analyzed their relevance within a light-footprint approach. 
Attention has been paid to a light footprint approach as an innovative concept in a post-
conflict peace-building process. Such a strategy should be introduced in the sectors of 
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good governance, development and economic reconstruction. However, this paper argued 
that a light-footprint approach should not extend to the security sphere in Afghanistan.
　　The security issues in Afghanistan have to be considered within a 23 year history of 
intractable civil wars. Security in Afghanistan is extremely complicated, including anti-
Government spoiler groups, the narcotics trade, and regional warlords, in addition to the 
terrorist groups. Considering these factors, the security issues in Afghanistan should have 
been tackled with a stronger physical commitment and political will. However, from the 
outset, the Bonn process did not adequately recognize the centrality of security to the 
entire enterprise. Without security, economic development and democratization are 
unattainable.58 Nevertheless, ISAF was initiated with an extremely modest size and 
mandate. A light-footprint approach should not be confused with a weak-footprint. 
　　The small size of security-building forces such as ISAF and the US-led Coalition 
force have also negatively influenced other security-related sectors. Especially, the fact is 
that the US troops have inevitably hired regional warlords to make up for the shortage of 
their official forces, and consequently the US has been reluctant to commit itself to the 
counter-narcotics and the DDR sectors which have involved such regional warlords.
　　In fact, the counter-narcotics and the DDR sectors have also suffered from a lack of 
commitment. Much of the money allocated for the British opium eradication scheme has 
not been spent properly and has ended up in the hands of regional warlords. The British 
strategy for alternative crops has also been too weak to be functional. This paper 
recommends more positive involvement of the international community to DDR in 
Afghanistan because of the fact that the Ministry of Defence still manipulates the DDP 
process without impartiality and because the key warlords have not been demobilized yet.
　　This paper provides two recommendations in the security sectors to enhance peace-
building in Afghanistan. These are promoting a monitoring system and more regional 
involvement. A new monitoring mechanism is urgently needed especially in the counter-
narcotics and DDR sectors. Even if it is conducted by civilian personnel, they will enhance 
the effectiveness of military operations in counter-narcotics and DDR. More regional 
troops should also be included in ISAF and other peace-building missions in Afghanistan. 
The adoption of a light-footprint approach can be considered after these issues are tackled.  
　　The scale and quality of international assistance for peace-building in Afghanistan 
should be based on a proper assessment of the capacity of the state. As the term “security 
first” indicates, the security sector has significantly influenced the entire process of peace-
building. While it may be appropriate in the other spheres of the peace-building process, 
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Afghanistan is still too immature a state for a light-footprint approach to be adopted in the 
security sector.
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